CO129-362 - Public Offices - 1909 — Page 151

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investigate the charges. The bitterest enemy of the Chiangchun was the Tutung who has charge of the Mongol interests. The Chiangchün brought a counter-charge of corruption against the Tutung, and it was then simply a matter of who had the longest purse. The Chiangchun, however, lost and was disgraced; it was thought in June 1908 that he might even lose his head. The Tutung's triumph was short-lived, for he was subsequently ordered to vacate his post and retire to his country house. He was bitterly angry and complained much against a Government which cast away honest official."

the "

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Rumour round Kweibuacheng, however, had it that the Tutung had feathered his nest remarkably well.

I am very doubtful whether the disgrace of the Chiangchin means a change of policy on the part of the Chinese Government towards the Ordos tribes; most probably not. The enmity of the Ordos Mongols is hardly to be feared, as they have no rifles; some Europeans with whom I spoke were of opinion that they could start a guerilla warfare and drive all the Chinese out of the districts. I think it very unlikely that they would do anything so foolish. They are more likely to sulk in their tents and do nothing. On the other hand it is possible that the Chinese Government have decided to slacken, temporarily at any rate, in their efforts to turn the Ordos into a province.

I venture to offer the following criticism on the policy of the Chinese Government as regards South Mongolia, namely that had they left well alone their object would have been attained with no friction. The immigration of the Chinese into the fertile portions of Mongolia was a process which was going on year by year quietly and unostentatiously and needed little encouragement. It seems to me to have been unwise on the part of the Chinese Government to openly adopt the policy of the absorption of the land belonging to the Mongols, thereby risking the raising of the cry "Mongolia for the Mongols."

North Mongolia.

The Chinese Government then decided to adopt towards Northern Mongolia the same process which was proving successful in the south, and issued instructions in 1902 (probably) to the Governor of Uliassutai and Amban of Urga to open up the land to Chinese colonists as elsewhere in Mongolia. The Governor of Uliassutai informed an English traveller in 1902 that he had replied to the Central Government that there was no land suitable for farming in North Mongolia. The Amban at Urga made the same reply, or perhaps made none at all as he was then in disgrace and was subsequently removed and succeded by the present Amban,

I asked the present Amban whether the scheme had advanced at all, but his Excellency gave me an evasive reply which, coupled with his pro-Mongol proclivities, his desire to stand well with the Bogdo, and general evasion of responsibility, proved to ne that he had done nothing in the matter beyond referring it back to Peking. The Manager of the Russo-Chinese Bank confirmed this.

The answer of the former Governor of Uliassutai was entirely untrue, for, as I have seen for myself, there are a quantity of well-watered villages in his district which would bear a large Chinese population, and where wheat, kaoliang, millet, &c., could be grown. His Excellency denied this in conversation, but it is interesting to note how Siberia, where the climate is as severe, has been colonized.

But the true reason for the hesitation of the Chinese officials to carry out their instructions is doubtless that they know that to do so would lead to the risk of a conflict with the Mongol Princes, for these latter would resent the limitation of the pasturage for the animals of the tribe.

As a Chinese official is responsible for the maintenance of good order in his district and liable to disgrace and loss of life if he fails in this respect, the Chinese officials in North Mongolia have hitherto declined to carry out a policy which they feel would run them into danger, especially as the troops at their disposal for restoring order are absurdly inadequate. However simple it may seem to the Chinese politician at Peking to carry out these instructions, I venture to predict that it will be a long time before the Chinese Government find one who, on arrival at his post, will not make the same reply that land is not suited for farming." An alternative would be for the Chinese Government to first solicit the goodwill of the Mongol Princes and the Bogdo to this scheme, but with the Russian opposition strong at Urga and Uliassutai, and the Mongols aware of the sympathetic attitude of the Russians, this goodwill is hardly likely to be accorded. It may be thought, therefore, that all possibility of the Chinese Government developing the country by increasing the number of Chinese settlers is entirely frustrated, but I do not think this is so. While the Chinese would be well advised not

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to press the question of colonization of the land by the farmer class in North Mongolia, their best line of action in my opinion would be to continue this process in South Mongolia where it is so flourishing, though not to press it too noisily even there; as regards the north there are other means at their disposal, one of which is the increase in number and well-being of the already existing Chinese communities, such as Urga, Uliassutai, Kobde; this could be done by improving trade communications and encouraging the influx of the small merchants' class. The other process is more intricate. Side by side with the emigration of Chinese farmers into Mongolia has grown up a small moneylending trader class, one member of which has established himself at very many of the Government stations on the road; these men sell miscellaneous goods to the Mongols and lend money. They reside permanently at their stations for some eight to ten months every year, and find it an extremely paying business. Were the Chinese Government to gradually change the status of these traders into Government agencies, either utilizing the services of those who are already in the field or sending others to take their place, they would be strengthening their hold over the Mongols to an enormous extent, and at the same time be benefiting them. This could be gradually extended possibly into a small farm in some of the fertile valleys, which could be extended still further with the advance of time. Indeed, it may be said that it would be advisable for the Chinese Government to take some such step to forestall the arrival of fixed Russian traders in the districts near Uliassutai; I met three of these who were established at posting stations five days distant from Uliassutai; and what one does others may imitate.

The maintenance of the status quo in North Mongolia presents the following points of observation: does this mean that the Chinese are not to increase their garrisons in that region, however necessary more troops may be to put down brigandage; are they to cease to form colonies; to restrict the operations of the banks; to forbid any more Chinese opening shops either in the large centres or along the Government road, the latter, it being remembered, being also moneylending establishments, or is it only to be limited to the maintenance of the present status of the land as pasturage and not farm land ? In the latter case it should be noted that this withdraws the whole of the cultivable land in Mongolia from Chinese settlers, for the limit of expansion has almost been reached in South Mongolia, although, all the land up to that line, it is true, has not yet been opened up. Should such an arrangement be come to it will make relations between the Chinese Government and the Northern Mongol Princes somewhat difficult, for the latter will recognize that the Chinese Government are not masters in their own possessions, and it will promote whatever feeling may now exist of a national independence, towards which aim they will fecl, however unwisely, that they can count on Russian sympathy. The suggestion of the maintenance of the status quo seems an ingenious one which cannot but have as its immediate result the leaving of North Mongolia to a continuance of Russian intrigues, with the ultimate result that Northern Mongol Princes lean permanently towards Russia.

The situation, if left to itself, is not serions, much less critical, until the Chinese Government find officials prepared to carry out their orders as regards the opening up of the land. When that occurs, and it is possible, of course, that the Chinese Government threaten an official with disgrace if he did not carry out his orders, thus placing him between Scylla and Charybdis, then the situation will become serious. In South Mongolia, where the opening up of the land movement is at their very door, the Central Government cau deal with any disturbances. In the event of the latter occurring there is the additional possibility of the movement spreading to the north, but this is unlikely to occur, unless the Mongol Princes are informed by interested parties that they may consider themselves seriously threatened. It is for the Chinese officials in Urga and Uliassutai, through the Bogdo, to reassure the Princes with a view to contradicting

this.

It must be remembered that, in any negotiations respecting this policy, the Russian Government will be playing with numerous cards unexposed, such as loan agreements It is a struggle contracted by the bank, and which would only come to light later on.

in North Mongolia between the Russians and the Chinese for supremacy, and the latter stand a good chance to win, unless their hands are tied by a status quo agreement. What would be the southern limit of the area affected by such an agreement? for the territories of the northern Princes stretch southwards almost to the limit of Chinese immigration, and it would be impossible to divide these in such a manner that such an agreement might only affect the northern and not the southern portion. The Mongols A status quo agreement only know one other country besides China, namely Russia. would be used by Russia to prove to the Mongols that she is the Power on whom to lean,

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